tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37540294.post2597447703584339443..comments2023-11-29T16:05:01.050+00:00Comments on Competition Law Board: Aftermarkets DiscussionGiorgio Montihttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05527866665555432207noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37540294.post-58315059742000761742008-03-22T14:44:00.000+00:002008-03-22T14:44:00.000+00:00Hello. This post is likeable, and your blog is ver...Hello. This post is likeable, and your blog is very interesting, congratulations :-). I will add in my blogroll =). If possible gives a last there on my blog, it is about the <A HREF="http://projetor-brasil.blogspot.com" REL="nofollow">Projetores</A>, I hope you enjoy. The address is http://projetor-brasil.blogspot.com. A hug.<A HREF="0285348548" REL="nofollow"></A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37540294.post-52789197997318021262008-01-07T00:35:00.000+00:002008-01-07T00:35:00.000+00:00Gostei muito desse post e seu blog é muito interes...Gostei muito desse post e seu blog é muito interessante, vou passar por aqui sempre =) Depois dá uma passada lá no meu site, que é sobre o <A HREF="http://www.provedorcrescenet.com" REL="nofollow">CresceNet</A>, espero que goste. O endereço dele é http://www.provedorcrescenet.com . Um abraço.<A HREF="0542372656" REL="nofollow"></A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37540294.post-50282470994684473972007-12-10T12:41:00.000+00:002007-12-10T12:41:00.000+00:00i strongly recommend reading borks' epilogue to th...i strongly recommend reading borks' epilogue to the 1993 edition of his antitrust paradox classic as it contains a very funny assessment of kodakAnxious Swannhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14085066819158593775noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-37540294.post-46716236929398933962007-12-08T04:53:00.000+00:002007-12-08T04:53:00.000+00:00Scalia's argument in dissent is rather compelling:...Scalia's argument in dissent is rather compelling: the tying would have been legal had it been made between the first market and the two aftermarkets (spare parts and services) since Kodak did not have any market power on the tying market (the first market)). Therefore, if the exact same result could have been achieved by Kodak with the benediction of the Jefferson Parish test, finding the tying of the two aftermarkets in violation of the Sherman Act reveals a rather formalistic view of antitrust.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13809466956201212313noreply@blogger.com